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Abstract
Think tanks became key political and economic actors during the twentieth century, creating and occupying an intellec-
tual and political position between academic institutions, the state, civil society, and public debate on organization and 
management. Think tanks are especially active in setting frames for what constitutes politically and socially acceptable 
ways of thinking about economic activity and the rights or obligations of corporations. Their operation and influence has 
been acknowledged and analysed in political science and policy analysis, but in organization and management studies they 
are almost entirely ignored. In this paper, we review the existing literature on think tanks to develop an ethical–political 
framework based on a Gramsci’s account of state–civil society relations, referring to historical case materials relating to a 
significant Brazilian think tank, the Instituto de Pesquisas e Estudos Sociais (IPES). We show how the IPES was successful 
in bringing then-controversial neoliberal perspectives on management and organization into mainstream political debate, 
where they could be discussed and ultimately accepted as morally and intellectually legitimate. We note the importance of 
management education and business schools with respect to think tanks in the development of a hegemonic pro-capitalist 
interpretation of corporate responsibility, and suggest this is worth more investigation. We conclude by outlining how think 
tanks are central to civil society acceptance of pro-corporate ideologies, how they might be researched regarding the ethical 
implications of the work they do, and how our approach provides a foundation for this.
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Introduction: The Rise of Think Tanks 
in the Twentieth Century
Unlike many other institutions designed to promote 
free inquiry, such as universities or some publications, 
think tanks do not enjoy large endowments, researcher 
tenure, or subscription revenue to insulate thinkers 
from paymasters. (The Economist 2017, p. 35)
It is suggestive that the anonymous journalist writing for 
The Economist, a newspaper founded to promote free market 
ideologies, finds think tanks problematic in funders’ influ-
ence over ideas promoted. The majority of contemporary 
think tanks promote versions of liberal or neoliberal capital-
ism that The Economist also elevates as the solution to most 
social, economic, or environmental issues. The very success 
of think tanks and their ability to marshal enviable financial 
resources in the service of a chosen cause seems to provoke 
discomfort for anyone with a commitment to knowledge and 
understanding founded on careful analysis of evidence.
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Despite such reservations, think tanks have become 
perhaps the most significant development of the last half 
century in how political and economic debate unfolds. 
This paper addresses the question of how these influential 
institutional actors developed in many societies around the 
world during the twentieth century, showing how think tanks 
became nationally and internationally significant influencers 
of civil society debate on the rights and obligations of corpo-
rations in capitalist societies. We draw on analysis conducted 
in political science to define think tanks, and combine this 
with a developing organization studies literature on how and 
why corporate or corporate-affiliated actors seek to shape 
political environments. Our argument is rooted in Antonio 
Gramsci’s theoretical outline of the relationship between 
state, economy, and social action. Gramsci (1971) under-
stands that although methodologically it may be important 
to separate market and political activities, this can lead to 
social assumptions as to whether or how mutual influence 
happens. In practice, market and policy are intertwined, 
manifest in how societal groups frame, and resolve disputes 
as to appropriate norms of economic action or what consti-
tutes an acceptable form of management or organization. 
The notion of hegemony, so central to Gramsci’s thinking, 
is also key to us here: our analysis teases out how the groups 
that fund and staff think tanks seek ideological dominance 
through the assertion of moral and intellectual leadership, 
and attempt to synchronize a dominant ideology across soci-
etal groups (Medvetz 2012).
Empirically, we provide a case analysis of the Instituto de 
Pesquisas e Estudos Sociais (IPES, founded 1960, dissolved 
1971), usually translated as the Institute for Social Research 
and Studies. This Brazil-based think tank was founded by 
mining executive Augusto Trajano de Azevedo Antunes and 
public utility executive Antonio Gallotti, along with others 
such as Paulo Ayres Filho, Joao Baptista Figueiredo, entre-
preneurs and executives with experience in the finance sec-
tor, and Gilberto Huber, heir to a significant fortune (Drei-
fuss 1980). IPES was financed by Brazilian corporations 
and multinational companies with local offices in Sao Paulo 
or Rio de Janeiro. In its founding charter, the think tank 
self-described as promoting and putting into practice two 
key ideologies: first, the economic principles underpinning 
then-US President John F. Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress, 
designed to promote capitalist cooperation between the US 
and Latin America; and second, the social teachings of the 
1961 Papal Encyclical Mater et Magistra, which took Chris-
tianity and social progress as its theme. In particular, the 
IPES claimed to promote the Encyclical’s message as to a 
more ‘humane’ capitalism.
The IPES remit was also explicit in its purpose of produc-
ing a new consensus in Brazilian society on the nature and 
aims of economic activity and the organization of society. 
It provided a physical and ideological space for business 
owners and corporate managers to congregate around a spe-
cific moral and social perspective on the need for a specific 
form of management, capitalist economic development, and 
societal organization for economic performance. In particu-
lar, the IPES promoted what Hanlon (2016, p. 61) terms 
‘neoliberal management’, in which market, corporation and 
state form a mutually supportive troika. During its existence, 
the IPES was also an important centre for the production of 
anti-Communist materials, in texts and films that supported 
the idea and practice of economic (neo)liberalism.
The IPES also sought a supra-national position, by bring-
ing together pro-Western, pro-capitalist actors in Brazil. 
Many of these visited from the US, such as the Business 
Group for Latin America, the Council for Latin America or 
the Alliance for Progress. All were heavily influenced by 
David Rockefeller, then president of Chase Manhattan Bank 
(Spohr 2016; Starling 1986; Dreifuss 1980). Our analysis 
also shows contact with actors from the European countries 
such as the German Friedrich Neumann Foundation, another 
theologically influenced promoter of individualist liberalism.
Nationalist Brazilian IPES members tended to look to 
the US as a model. As Spohr (2016) suggests, the IPES was 
part of the effort to reproduce and disseminate the ‘Ameri-
can way of doing business’ in Brazil. This highlights how 
the think tank served as a means of connecting Brazilian 
businessmen with American officials and business people 
interested in influencing the political economy of Brazil 
(Spohr 2016). All members were strictly anti-Communist 
and often socially conservative Catholics, amassing institu-
tional support from both of those powerful groups (Dreifuss 
1980). This hostility to Communism, along with the links 
drawn between Communism and atheism, were key elements 
in mobilizing people in favour of the free market economic 
ideology that IPES promoted (Power 2015).
Our analysis suggests that Leacock’s (1979, p. 669) 
labelling of the IPES as the pre-eminent ‘political organi-
zation of Brazilian businessmen’ of the 1960s is accu-
rate. More specifically, we argue that IPES functioned as 
a closed safe space where pro-capitalist business people 
and other social elites could negotiate a shared ideological 
program on economic policies (Dreifuss 1980, 1981) and 
‘how to do business’. In this sense, the IPES functioned 
like other contemporaneous conservative think tanks in 
the US (Fischer 2002; Parmar 2015). During this period, 
early in the development of business schools as a global 
presence, debates on ethics and the purpose of manage-
ment were very prominent (Khurana 2007). As Khurana 
(2007, p. 365) argues, however, these debates subsequently 
narrowed down, such that managerial identity and prac-
tice as represented in business schools failed ‘to put the 
subject within any holistic, institutional context’. To this 
we would add ‘political’ as a key context, and suggest that 
think tanks are a key instrument for framing business as a 
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political activity. As Djelic and Etchanchu (2017, p. 642) 
highlight, ‘the frontier between economy and polity has 
always been blurry and shifting and… firms have played 
for a very long time a political role’, often through fund-
ing and supporting think tanks. The corporate decision to 
fund a think tank that sponsors a certain group of ideas, 
such as neoliberal management, should be understood both 
historically and in terms of contemporary dynamics. The 
dualism between state and market, founded on the assump-
tion that corporations are politically neutral, does not hold 
after a closer look reveals how much effort and resource 
corporations and their leaders mobilize to shape political 
debate through think tanks.
We therefore also respond to Barley’s (2010) call to con-
duct more research addressing how and why corporations 
seek to shape political environments. US-based think tanks 
were an important contributor to the development of Ameri-
can social, political and economic hegemony overseas (Par-
mar 2002a, b, 2004, 2005, 2015), shaping and disseminat-
ing Americanism in management schools around the globe 
(Cooke and Alcadipani 2015; Khurana and Spender 2012). 
Our analysis, focusing on the power relations manifest in a 
think tank’s purposeful interventions as part of attempts to 
accomplish economic, ethical and political transformation, 
increases the understanding of think tanks as central to the 
ethical–political process of describing economic contexts 
in both intellectual and moral terms. We already know from 
archival research that some members of the US political 
establishment sought to export its corporate model through 
the creation of business schools and private research foun-
dations (Cooke and Alcadipani 2015; Parmar 2002a, b); 
our analysis further demonstrates how Brazilian corporate, 
religious, civil and political groups organized to influence 
each other in the development of a synchronized ideologi-
cal message, with a respected think tank as the fulcrum of 
this activity.
We structure the rest of the paper as follows. First, we 
review research on think tanks, mainly in the field of politi-
cal science. This body of work focuses on the political nature 
and effects of think tanks. We relate this to the slowly devel-
oping literature on the corporate–political nexus in organ-
ization studies, focusing on the potential of analysis that 
brings relations between such powerful institutions to light. 
We then provide a brief account of our historical research 
methodology, a form of critical organizational history. That 
leads into our archival analysis of IPES, demonstrating its 
local and conceptual significances, as a case study. We con-
clude with a discussion of the implications of our analysis 
for understanding the inherently ethical–political nature of 
civil society debate about the nature of corporations, econ-
omy and society, to develop suggestions for further research 
on think tanks.
Think Tanks: A Political Apparatus 
in the Dispute for Hegemony
Gramsci (1971) conceived the relationship the state and the 
civil society as intertwined and borderless. For him, mod-
ern societies overcame the notion of the state as solely a 
politico-juridical bureaucratic institution that guaranteed 
order through coercion early in the twentieth century. Gram-
sci understood that a modern functioning state needed to 
achieve political hegemony through means other than coer-
cion. He argued that this could be accomplished through 
building consensus through various private institutions, such 
as political parties, clubs, unions and business.
In this understanding of society, the state is not the only 
institutional actor with the potential to exercise political 
power (Rose and Miller 1992). Political scientists are clear 
that think tanks are key to understanding the relationship 
between actors in this paradigm, as they translate knowl-
edges across institutional boundaries to guide political 
debate in specific ideological directions (Medvetz 2012). 
Understanding how and why think tanks operate is therefore 
important to the analysis of the complex interplay of politics, 
economy, ideology and ethics, as they are able to intervene 
in policy debate in ways that are ungoverned by regulations 
that constrain other actors, such as universities.
In organization studies, Barley (2010) suggested recently 
that synthesizing empirical and conceptual material across 
organization studies, history and political science is cen-
tral to understanding institutional interaction of this kind, 
to gauge the effects of what he calls ‘corporate political 
action’. We would suggest that Gramsci’s (1971) work pro-
vides us with a key means of understanding how state, civil, 
economic and political actors negotiate ethical–political 
ideological disputes at the macro and micro levels. Gramsci 
argues that groups working in different areas of society strive 
to achieve both moral and intellectual leadership, manifest 
in how they promote ideological positions on the economy. 
A wide range of organizations can engage in the ideologi-
cal clashes that characterize disputes as to the hegemonic 
moral and intellectual understanding of economic activity 
(Levy and Egan 2003; Levy and Spicer 2013). To achieve 
dominance, groups seek compromise and negotiate their 
programmes with other actors, in order to convince them 
to accept their ideological resolutions for material disputes. 
The hegemony that results from such struggles is, accord-
ing to Gramsci, ethical, political and economic, because the 
economy and decisions about how to distribute the national 
income are the decisive nucleus of debate on how to organ-
ize modern states.
In contemporary societies, think tanks therefore per-
form a significant function as part of the policy formation 
network that develops and disseminates political strategies 
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for the economy (Levy and Egan 2003). They constitute 
an important presence in the constellation of organiza-
tions that influence society and build hegemony, reframing 
ideas into discourses that are amenable to powerful actors 
(Fischer 2003, 2002).
Definitional clarity is important here, because think 
tanks often purposefully blur their status. Their names 
often imply academic status through the use of educational 
terms such as ‘institute’ or ‘academy’. The origin of the 
term think tank itself is unclear. In everyday use, it signi-
fies a group of experts, qualified academically, politically 
or through work experiences, which produces reports with 
a particular economic or political focus. Ideal-typical defi-
nitions often emphasize their lack of power:
think-tanks are non-governmental institutions; intel-
lectually, organizationally and financially autono-
mous from government, political parties or organ-
ized interests; and set up with the aim of influencing 
policy. They have no formal decision-making 
power and claim political neutrality while often 
making no secret of their ideological standpoints 
(Pautz 2011, 423—emphasis added).
Think tanks reach broad audiences by influencing and 
bringing together elites from different sectors (Levy and 
Egan 2003; Fischer 2002). Think tanks often cut across 
societal groups: they draw on the discursive symbolic 
resources of higher education; there is usually a substan-
tive aspect to their title (e.g. defence, economics, peace, 
security); they frequently carry a nominative indication 
that they are focused on policy or political action. While 
some suggest excluding think tanks that take an ‘advo-
cacy’ position from analysis (Li 2014), we retain that 
aspect of the definition here, on the basis of the fact that 
all think tanks engage in at least implicit advocacy. Our 
analytical position therefore denies neutrality in the pro-
duction of knowledge, within think tanks, in their funding 
foundations, and in their ideological purposes (McGoey 
2015; Yep and Ngok 2006). Founders and funders include 
philanthropists, large corporations, interest groups, chari-
ties and political parties.
Think tanks can be set up for a range of practical and 
political reasons. Ideologically, Blair (2013, p. 449) suggests 
they tend to be ‘the result of a mixture of foresight, clearly 
defined need, and the politics of the time’. This implies that 
think tanks are forward looking, pragmatic, and temporally 
bounded in their utility. Staffing is usually based on a com-
bination of network membership and pragmatism, a mixture 
of a small number of permanent and a larger number of 
temporary or affiliated staff.
A think tank’s functional purpose centres on the provi-
sion of politically useful information, analysis and advice 
to elite groups (Lagendijk and Needham 2012; Stone and 
Denham 2004), with just the required amount of subject-
specific authority to legitimate it (Blair 2013). Written and 
verbal reports tend to be oriented towards lay comprehensi-
bility. Think tanks’ products frequently attract media atten-
tion for their conclusions or proposals for action, and are 
often criticized for the poor quality of their empirical or 
conceptual bases (Beloff 1977). However, the products are 
widely recognized as influential and authoritative in fram-
ing public debate (such as by the Economist in 2017). Some 
also specialize in policy development and implementation. 
They respond to requests from political overseers, address-
ing policy puzzles or muddles and contemporaneous trends, 
navigating carefully between demands to respond to pay-
masters and the need for institutional credibility constructed 
through claims to objectivity and independence.
Temporally and geographically, think tanks have prolif-
erated since the 1970s, particularly in countries or regions 
where wealthy supra-national or global organizations are 
based (Stone and Denham 2004), especially Europe (home 
of the European Union) and the US (home of the World 
Bank and the United Nations). Some think tanks achieve 
global reach (Stone 2004), and may be present beyond their 
home countries either as ‘branches’ or as stand-alone insti-
tutions. Analysis has, however, focused on the Europe and 
the US; the presence and activities of think tanks in Latin 
America in particular have not been extensively researched 
or discussed (Braun et al. (2004), despite their increas-
ing activities in that area as democracy has been adopted 
more widely (see also Yep and Ngok (2006) on the lack of 
research on think tanks in parts of Asia).
Political scientists have suggested that think tanks’ rela-
tionship with/to popular media outlets should be a key vec-
tor of analysis (Denham and Garnett 2004), especially as 
the internet and social media have shifted such communi-
cation in tone and content. This is clearly a key issue that 
future research could consider in relation to media cultures 
of debates related to business and management. Think tank 
communication or ‘discursive performance’ might be ana-
lysed as a means of shedding light on the promotion of spe-
cific ethical–political messages (Lagendijk and Needham 
2012) related to economy and society. In addition, we would 
highlight the importance of think tanks that act as ‘peak 
organizations’: ‘associations of other organizations, which, 
as members, fund the peak organization’s operations. Peak 
organizations are well situated to become command posts 
for influencing firms and industries’ (Barley 2010, p. 783).
In sum, from the political science literature in this area 
and in relation to organization studies, we draw the con-
clusion that it is important for management scholars to pay 
more attention to academic intermediaries such as think 
tanks, especially as legitimating devices that contribute 
towards promotion of specific political and ethical ideolo-
gies of business and management. This in turn suggests that 
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think tanks should be held politically and socially account-
able for the effects of the contributions they make to pub-
lic understanding. We seek to start this debate as follows. 
First, we provide a brief outline of the sources we draw on 
to analyse our case think tank, the IPES, and its activities. 
We then present an empirical narrative that emphasizes the 
social and political–economical location of IPES, which we 
see as central to our understanding the life of the Institute 
and think tanks as ethical–political actors affecting debate 
on the purpose of business and management. We then pro-
vide a brief discussion of the implications of our analysis, 
focused on the considerable potential for further research in 
this empirical and theoretical area.
Methods and Methodology: Archive Sources 
and the Construction of an Analytical 
Narrative
Our analytical purpose is located at the blurred frontier 
between management history and organizational history 
(Godfrey et al. 2016). We place great importance on con-
text (Kipping and Üsdiken 2014), using primary historical 
sources (Lipartito 2014) as data for contextualized case 
study analysis that seeks relevance beyond the specific 
instance. We take into account historical complexities as 
a means of theorizing (Maclean et al. 2016). History here 
is not an unproblematic reconstruction of the past; rather 
it is a deductive approximation of events that can never be 
fully recovered (Weatherbee et al. 2012). Archival research 
is more insightful when it considers the many narratives 
that may and may not be included in an archive, and the 
conditions of their creation (Barros 2016; Decker 2013). 
Notwithstanding, while archives are therefore always par-
tial, we can build meaningful analytical narrative with the 
sources (Barros 2016).
Our analysis is based on research in one of Brazil’s most 
prominent source providers, the Arquivo Nacional/National 
Archive. As happens with every such collection, chance is a 
component of the sources that survive. Many different logics 
operate in choosing to retain or discard materials. We treat 
our sources as monuments, following a critical approach 
towards the idea of proof and archived files (Le Goff 1992; 
Schwartz and Cook 2002). What is archived and allowed to 
survive follows rules that are neither natural nor neutral, and 
tells of a history bounded by power disputes (Cook 2011; 
Schwartz and Cook 2002).
We analyse the IPES document collection under ten 
different categories: courses, movies, photos, budget and 
finances, the organization and its functioning, patrimony, 
human resources, communications and correspondence. We 
were inspired by Bardin’s (2011) version of content analy-
sis in our treatment of these sources. Bardin advocates an 
open approach to reading sources that highlights how neither 
reality nor data are transparent, to argue that an analytical 
method should be developed to enrich the reading of the 
texts.
Initially we analysed samples of each of the ten catego-
ries. This suggested we should focus on correspondence to 
and from IPES, because there we find communications out-
side the rigid patterns of the formal language of other docu-
ments. This allowed a better understanding of organizations 
and people involved with the IPES in the development of 
the ethical–political positions that frame activity and com-
munication. Subsequently, we decided to add source mate-
rial from four influential Brazilian newspapers: two based 
in Rio de Janeiro (Correio da Manhã and O Globo) and two 
based in São Paulo (Folha de São Paulo and Estado de São 
Paulo). All were sympathetic towards the IPES and oper-
ated as approved outlets for the ideological messages IPES 
sought to communicate. Finally, we included source material 
from minutes of meetings and formal Institute documents, 
as a means of confirming our analysis. All translations into 
English are ours.
Instituto de Pesquisas e Estudos Sociais 
(IPES): A Think Tank in Context and Action
Modus Operandi: IPES Operations Over Time
As in many countries around the world in the late 1940s and 
1950s, Brazil provided fertile ground for the foundation of 
expert-led think tanks (and continues to do so—see Raufflet 
and Amaral (2007) on the Abrinq Foundation, for example, 
founded in 1989). Perhaps the most high profile initiative of 
that period is the Instituto Superior de Estudos Brasileiros 
(ISEB), sometimes called the Higher Institute of Brazil-
ian Studies. As Toledo (1998) observes, intellectuals have 
always taken active part in political life in Brazil. However, 
the ISEB differed in its publicly stated purpose of promoting 
the social and economic cause of hitherto neglected groups, 
purposefully bringing together ideology, politics, ethics, and 
social science.
ISEB was funded and supported by the Brazilian Ministry 
of Education and Culture from 1955. It provided ‘sophisti-
cated articulations of nationalism and development’ (Griesse 
2007, p. 25) to encourage economic independence through 
cultural nationalism, socialism, and a specific form of Chris-
tianity. The IPES can be understood as both ISEB’s precur-
sor and counterpart. In a pamphlet distributed among its 
associates and to selected newspapers in May, 1962, IPES 
members argued:
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it is necessary that managers manage, and avoid lev-
eling themselves with political marginals. Those mar-
ginals can only cause real damage to the nation when 
those who have great responsibility omit themselves 
[from public debate].
Among the ‘marginals’, many ISEB associates are listed. 
Around the same time, the IPES defined itself in a second 
pamphlet, again distributed to selected Brazilian newspapers 
(emphasis in original):
The Instituto de Pesquisas e Estudos Sociais [IPES] is 
an initiative of Brazilian entrepreneurs, with the par-
ticipation of liberal professionals. They are united in 
an apolitical entity by the sum of their background and 
experiences, and their will to find together Brazilian 
solutions to national problems. The purpose of IPES 
is the study of democratic solutions to the problems 
posed by national development, the formation of a 
legitimate public opinion, clarified and participative, 
aimed at strengthening the [democratic] regime and 
towards economic and social progress. The launch-
ing of the Alliance for Progress and the encyclical 
Mater et Magistra gave a new perspective to Brazilian 
businessmen, by committing them to the fulfillment of 
their immediate duties, from which they cannot escape, 
[especially] the permanent participation in the public 
life of the country.
The ideals and visions pursued here are aligned to the 
stances the Alliance for Progress was promoting at the time, 
shortly after President Kennedy’s death, but IPES associates 
claimed independence from it:
Our Institute has no [direct] connection with the Alli-
ance for Progress since we are only propagandists of 
this grandiose plan that seeks to solve our great eco-
nomic and social problems (Correspondence, May 
1965).
ISEB, as is the case with so many think tanks, did not 
have a long life—when it was closed by the military gov-
ernment in 1964, it was already experiencing difficulties 
(Toledo 1998). We describe it here because of its relevance 
to understanding the context of think tank development, and 
in tracking controversies in political debate on economy and 
society. As ISEB closed, the IPES developed as a public 
voice with political support. In its July 1964 newsletter, 
IPES claimed:
in the first months after the Revolution [in fact a coup 
d’etat, led by the Armed Forces against a democrati-
cally elected President] the IPES became an indefati-
gable machine for the diffusion of the ideas of the new 
Brazilian government [a military regime that would 
endure until 1985]. Its main concern is to undo the 
waves of discredit provoked by the international con-
spirators in the service of totalitarianism, who were 
committed to presenting to the world a disfigured 
image of the Brazilian Revolution.
It was inevitable that Brazil, as the largest country in the 
region, would become a focus for anti-Communist US eco-
nomic policy. There is no consensus about when the US 
started favouring a coup to overthrow President João Gou-
lart, who was connected to labour movements and vowing 
to make reforms that would turn Brazil into a fairer soci-
ety. However, it is clear that US agents played a key role 
in the removal of his government (Dewitt 2009; Loureiro 
2014). The US had offered a sympathetic ear to the military 
personnel who wanted to block Goulart’s ascension to the 
presidency in 1961, and it was obvious that Kennedy’s sup-
port for democracy in Latin America was less strong than 
his fear of a series of Cuban revolutions on a larger scale 
(Loureiro 2014).
US intervention in this area took a unique form. Agents 
helped to brand old but effective ethical touchstones such as 
God, family and liberty, and indirectly or covertly helped 
finance mass political demonstrations and opposition cam-
paigns (Weis 2001). This activity could take unusual forms. 
The US government, for example, was keen to use the 
powerful image of Brazilian housewives marching against 
the government, in such a way that it could portray protest 
against a constitutional government as a democratic and 
ethically progressive act (Power 2015). The US also used 
the Alliance for Progress to lend money to opposition gov-
ernors to build alliances in the case of a crisis (Dewitt 2009; 
Loureiro 2014; Weis 2001).
The Alliance for Progress had been founded on President 
Kennedy’s promise to tackle anti-Americanism and Commu-
nism in Latin America (Loureiro 2014). Its aims were close 
to those of the Brazilian President Juscelino Kubitschek in 
the late 1950s. Kubitchek oversaw a push towards Brazilian 
industrialization and many public works, including the coun-
try’s capital Brasilia. He also pursued an aligned but inde-
pendent foreign policy, to promote what he called Operation 
Pan America (OPA) to increase cooperation. The initiative 
was an important marker that pushed the US towards a new 
approach in relation to Latin America (Darnton 2012; Weis 
2001). The Kennedy administration thereby sought to com-
bine negative or obstructive measures with specific forms of 
economic development, seeking to secure Latin American 
countries from Soviet influence (Hakim 2011).
The Catholic Church also supported a number of conserv-
ative political and economic movements, often in the hope 
of marginalizing liberation theology and pockets of Church 
support for the more radical trade unions. The IPES helped 
the Church in this by funding conservative Catholic trade 
unions (Circulos Operários) and encouraging contributions 
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from major landowners and various other pro-capitalist 
groups (Dreifuss 1980, 1981; Power 2015; Ramirez 2012). 
The rapid incorporation of large masses of people into the 
urban proletariat challenging the traditional social order, 
combined with the diminution in State control compared 
to urban industrialist political power, were also significant 
in this. It is in this complex context of multiple competing 
actors each with its own ideological purpose that the IPES 
was founded, drawing on established think tank practice and 
extending it further as a means of influencing public debate 
and political action.
The Construction of a Legitimate Perspective
Formally, IPES was founded as a non-profit organization to 
devote resources to non-partisan research, educating people, 
business and government (Abelson 2002). In the more col-
ourful words of one influential Brazilian economist Roberto 
Campos:
The impetus of the reforms of Castello Branco’s gov-
ernment was in part due to the previous work from 
Jorge de Mellos Flores and [Mario Henrique] Simon-
sen at the IPES, which was some kind of think tank 
created by Goulart to engineer a liberal alternative 
to Jango’s [the nickname of the former president 
João Goulart] socialist craziness (Campos, 1997, our 
emphasis).
The IPES promoted ideas prevalent within the economic 
elite of Brazilian society, and brought together disparate 
arguments against progressive social reforms, to encourage 
enforcement of an authoritarian view of liberal economics 
and conservative politics (Dreifuss 1980, p. 981). It was 
organized into regional branches, the most important in the 
key economic cities of São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Belo Hori-
zonte and Porto Alegre. There were many divisions within 
IPES, each responsible for production of different materials 
that would support the new military government, frame soci-
etal debate, and intervene in academic life (Cardoso 2011). 
One of its branches was also specifically responsible for 
denouncing ‘Communist infiltration’ in public life.
The business owners and business managers united by 
IPES created the most influential group of the many try-
ing to overthrow the Brazilian constitutional government 
of late 1950s and early 1960s (Dreifuss 1980, 1981; Spohr 
2016; Starling 1986). They provided low-profile but influ-
ential support to the military, organizing sympathizers in 
the armed forces, and arguing publicly against support for 
progressive reforms. Although the IPES received most of 
its money from Brazilian business owners, managers and 
companies, it also counted on substantial support from mul-
tinationals and the US government (Dreifuss 1981; Ramirez 
2012). One of the companies that contributed most signifi-
cantly was the Brazilian arm of Esso:
We note with great pleasure the generous donation 
from Esso Brasileira de Petróleo S.A to the Institute 
for Social Studies and Research - IPÊS/GB, worth 
fifteen hundred ‘Cruzados Novos’. This gesture is a 
demonstration of appreciation, but it is also a stimulus 
that induces us to persevere in fighting for the sake of 
freedom and democracy, grounded in the principles 
of Christian faith and working for improvement and 
toughening of Free Enterprise in our country. [...] we 
express ourselves in the name of the youth who are 
preparing in this House for the exercise of dignifying 
business ventures (Correspondence, April 1969)
As in the Brazilian branches of many other multinationals 
at the time, Esso’s office was led by a member of the Armed 
Forces. The US government also made significant contribu-
tions, channeling funds to IPES in order to support their 
activities. This showed up in attempts to help the Institute 
influence Brazilian regional elections in 1962, a sign of the 
strategic relevance achieved by the IPES, while also showing 
that the US had few concerns about bypassing Brazilian sov-
ereignty. Receiving money either from foreign multination-
als or foreign governments was, however, a double-edged 
strategy for IPES (Ramirez 2012). Many supporters were 
fiercely nationalist, and felt that accepting help from alien 
powers could affect the legitimacy of their institutions. In 
addition, after congressional hearings on forms of financing, 
the IPES had to deal with those funds with more caution, 
concealing their origins more effectively.
Since some of the money channelled by the US came via 
the Alliance for Progress, the business people associated 
with the IPES also began to seek reciprocal influence over 
the Alliance (Spohr 2016). They wished to guarantee that 
their economic and political interests would be protected, 
while increasing collaboration with their American coun-
terparts (Spohr 2016). Balancing the need not to appear 
anti-American and the desire to promote nationalism, IPES 
members dedicated considerable effort to framing discus-
sions of the Brazilian economic situation and the alleged 
Communist menace. Due to the high level of participation 
of business people as financial supporters, the IPES also 
had a great deal to say about their role in society (Loureiro 
2014). The Institute sponsored newspapers articles, made 
short movies, promoted theatrical plays, commissioned pam-
phlets and books, and sought help from the US Embassy 
book program to edit and distribute publications (Black 
1977). It also counted on the sympathy of the US media 
towards their objectives (Weis 1997).
As they gained in confidence and influence during the 
1960s, the Brazilian business people involved with the IPES 
began to explore the idea of an international alliance with 
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counterparts from other Latin American countries (Spohr 
2016). This can be understood as indicative of a wider 
reshuffling of emerging political forces in Latin America 
(Ramirez 2012). The IPES approach centred on limited 
concessions towards workers, to undermine support for 
labour-oriented parties manifest in the growing ‘labourism’ 
political movement. It is important to mention here that there 
was an asymmetry between the economic power held by the 
business elites and the political power they had over the Bra-
zilian state in the beginning of the 1960s (Dreifuss 1981).
Members of the Institute embraced the inter-related ideas 
that they were saving Brazilian democracy, fighting corrup-
tion, reinforcing religious freedom and combating subver-
sion, key themes that appear in communications produced 
from within the Institute (Bortone 2014; Cardoso 2011; 
Power 2015). The IPES crafted the notion of a Manichean 
battle between good and evil, reflected in how they were 
portrayed in the two main news reports in the US about the 
heroic participation of the ‘businessmen’ in the coup d’etat 
against João Goulart (Siekman 1964; Weis 1997).
In its final moments, the IPES became a victim of its suc-
cess in reframing public debate and aspects of state policy. 
Its inability to adapt to the new context developed by the 
government it helped construct brought about its end (Ram-
irez 2009). Various members of the IPES resigned from it 
to occupy state positions, directing reforms in national and 
local government structures (Bortone 2014; Ramirez 2009). 
This loss of qualified people was made worse with the chal-
lenge of attracting more professional technicians who could 
frame ideological arguments in a more neutral wording fit 
for the new order. It is also important to note the statist and 
authoritarian route taken by the new military regime, which 
may have contributed to the weakening of the institute since 
it had economic liberal roots (Bortone 2014).
Without a clear political enemy in João Goulart, the Insti-
tute, already divided in debate about the tactics that should 
be used to combat Communism and how to press for an 
even more liberal economy, had to be reoriented. However, 
the number of associates fell year by year, and even after 
becoming an organization oriented towards public interest, 
the IPES could not sustain itself, closing its doors in the 
early years of the 1970s. Brief as IPES’ existence was, we 
are reading it here as a paradigmatic case of the way busi-
ness people can operate in the public arena to influence gov-
ernments and society.
Think Tank Development and Activity: 
A Three‑Stage Process
From this case description, we can suggest that the IPES 
passed through three moments in its development. First, 
the Institute was represented as an advocacy organization, 
creating programmes to counter Presidential propos-
als, advertising its worldview openly or through indirect 
channels:
Important business sectors took a stand in the discus-
sions that led to popular enlightenment, but this is 
not yet complete. The commitment to study and solve 
the problems that are tying up Brazil, which open a 
national flank to the social agitation of the forces that 
do not represent the popular aspirations or incarnate 
the national interests, cannot cease. On the contrary, 
the Brazilian businessmen that also fight for reforms 
must renew their efforts so that Congress will adopt 
the laws that will liberate the people and the Brazilian 
economy from the obstacles that tie [the development 
of the country]. (IPES monthly bulletin, February 
1963)
The documents we have analysed to construct our case 
suggest that members of the IPES sought to influence public 
opinion in different ways during each of these moments. In 
its early stages, members of the Institute tried to raise public 
support and challenge government proposals through pub-
lication of alternative versions of law reforms proposed by 
government. In a way, the Institute tried to emulate a shadow 
cabinet. The clearest explanation of this strategy is found in 
a letter from a key member of the Institute, Jorge Oscar de 
Mello Flores, to IPES president, Glycon de Paiva:
We shall prepare, as fast as possible, versions of the 
reforms proposed by the leftists, people from the Bra-
zilian Labor Party and demagogues, considered vital 
to our country.
Those projects are (1) agrarian reform [...]; (2) banking 
system reform [...]; (3) urban reform [...]; (4) admin-
istrative reform [...]; (5) tax reform [...]; (6) electoral 
reform [...]. Various advantages would come from 
those proposals: we would oppose our technical pro-
jects to the demagogical ones. We would show that 
the productive classes do not object to reforming the 
system (Correspondence, 1962)
The writers expected IPES associates and other sympa-
thetic business people to support their alternative propos-
als. A group of legislators that received direct and indirect 
financial supports from IPES was tasked with presenting the 
alternatives on the floor of the parliament. This approach is 
a relatively conventional think tank or pressure group tactic.
The Institute also supported an arm called the ‘Pub-
lic Opinion Group’ with responsibility for encouraging 
news outlets to report IPES-sponsored opinions and per-
spectives; this group was especially active during the sec-
ond moment of the think tank’s development. This tac-
tic proved relatively straightforward, unsurprisingly, as 
the Institute counted in its ranks people from important 
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media vehicles such as the owner of the biggest Brazilian 
newspaper of that time, O Estado de São Paulo. The Insti-
tute sponsored radio news programmes and counted on 
broadly sympathetic coverage from most Brazilian news 
media outlets. Alongside this, the Institute often provided 
financial aid to trade unions that worked closely with the 
Catholic Church. The business people congregated around 
IPES wanted to promote the idea that it was possible to 
achieve harmony between workers, managers, the main-
stream conservative Church, and the interests of capital 
owners.
The roles of the state in the Brazilian economy and Bra-
zilian society more generally were also a primary concern 
of the Institute, as outlined in correspondence from 1963: 
‘it is indispensable to write a working paper and distribute 
it to the members of congress and people in conferences 
[sponsored by the institute] [...] the IPES wants to engage in 
a study of the problems of statism’. In these ways, the group 
made effective use of links into parliament and news outlets 
to promote themselves as representing ‘the new mentality of 
business people, using mass media to promote these argu-
ments through articles, speeches and interviews pointing to 
democracy as the best form of government and showing the 
risks of extreme solutions’ (Correspondence, 1962) at differ-
ent moments. In the second moment, after the coup d’etat, 
the Institute began to operate more as a mediator between 
businesspeople and government, inviting ministers and other 
public agents to conferences and providing answers to ques-
tions formulated by IPES associates. The Institute operated 
as a central agency in the placement of members in and 
around key offices of state in the new government. Immedi-
ately after the coup at least seven IPES members achieved 
important positions in the government. Among those were 
general Golbery do Couto e Silva, who led the Institute’s 
‘intelligence unit’, denouncing and outing supposed com-
munist agents in Goulart’s government. Golbery went on to 
become the head of the state’s National Intelligence Service 
(the feared SNI), responsible for hunting those considered as 
enemies of the regime. Other names linked to the institute 
also became part of the new dictatorial government: Rob-
erto Campos (Ministry of Economic Planning), José Garrido 
Torres (President of the Brazilian National Development 
Bank, BNDES), Denio Nogueira (Central Bank, BC), and 
Paulo de Assis-Ribeiro (President of the Institute for Land 
Reform, IBRA). The BC and the IBRA were formulated 
following studies conducted and published by the IPES; 
banking and land reforms followed predictions from the 
early letters written by Jorge Oscar de Mello Flores, quoted 
above. The presence of Roberto Campos in the Ministry of 
Economic Planning also allowed for ideas developed within 
IPES to become a multi-year economic development plan 
(PAEG).
In sum, we would suggest that in the immediate aftermath 
of the coup, the IPES became very powerful, due to various 
direct connections to the new government:
Hence the IPES/GB was prepared to serve as a link 
between private enterprise and the government, pro-
moting a series of debates under the general heading 
‘Perspectives on National Entrepreneurship’ in 1966. 
Hence also the importance of their participation 
through questions [in committees and parliament] that 
seek to clarify points that may seem unclear (Corre-
spondence, February 1966).
This same modus operandi appears in other letters:
We deem it of paramount importance and of imme-
diate interest to provide, whenever possible… direct 
contact with the representatives of the Government 
from which it results, [to provide] not only a better 
understanding of the problems that afflict the business 
environment, but that also allows the Governmental 
authorities to listen to the views and the yearnings of 
that laborious class (Correspondence, March 1966).
It also started its public defence of the military regime:
We have a special interest in spreading truths and 
concepts aimed at strengthening the democratic [sic] 
regime, unmasking the illusory Communist doc-
trine, whose enslaving practice we wish, with all our 
strength, to see away, at least from our America (Cor-
respondence, July 1966).
The support for the military dictatorship, portrayed as a 
democratic regime, is affirmed in other documents.
This brings us to the third moment, during which IPES 
members recognized the potential of education and learning 
to promote ideologies and frames for debate. At this point, 
the IPES was in a certain sense at the height of its power, 
with well-positioned government officials as active Institute 
members. This period lasted for around three years:
The ministry for commerce and industry signalled his 
willingness to accept the invitation from IPES’ busi-
nessmen, who had a recognized participation in the 
March 31st movement […]; This year agenda prepared 
by the [IPES] also contains lectures by the president of 
the National Bank for Economic Development [Banco 
Nacional de desenvolvimento] [...] of the president of 
the Central Bank [...], the president of Banco do Brasil 
[the Brazilian state owned bank] [...] and [...]. ..] of the 
president of the National Housing Bank (Folha de São 
Paulo, 24/03/1966).
As the new dictatorial government was being consoli-
dated, the IPES tried to change its focus again. It had been 
created as an anti-Goulart, pro-market think tank, and 
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therefore had to be repositioned after its ideological objec-
tives had been accomplished politically. After brokering 
meetings between government and business people, the 
Institute focused on offering business management educa-
tion. That is made explicit in a letter to General Golbery do 
Couto e Silva, then Dow Chemical’s CEO in Brazil:
In the course of the last few years, the entity [IPES] 
has progressively assumed characteristics of an educa-
tion body in the service of business. [...] But in order 
for the IPES to continue in its educational function, the 
support is necessary of all those who believe, as we do, 
in the effectiveness of individual initiative and in the 
privatization of the instruments of production as the 
driving force for national development (Correspond-
ence, May 1970).
During the years 1966 and 1967, the Institute moved 
closer to becoming an educational organization, offering 
courses in management and finance:
EDUCATION GROUP: In the educational area, the 
Institute progressively broadens its scope of action, 
with assistance to the company through a system of 
courses both technical and professional, aiming at 
reducing costs and increasing productivity […] (IPES, 
Informative pamphlet, October 1968).
The courses presented in the document were on Project 
Evolution and Review Technique [PERT], Introduction 
to Management, Mathematics for finance, and a Higher 
Education Course in Finance.
This last course was a full-time programme for graduate 
students. It had 27 people enrolled in its first iteration (Infor-
mation pamphlet, March 1969), which can be considered a 
success, since Brazil did not, and still does not, have a strong 
tradition in full-time management education courses. It also 
happened at the same time the Institute established alliances 
with other institutions in higher education, such as the Cath-
olic University at Rio de Janeiro, Campinas and Sao Paulo.
Thus, from a combative stance towards government, the 
Institute moved to a more collaborative attitude and started 
focusing its efforts on offering educational courses to part-
ners and middle managers from sponsoring organizations. 
Besides those already mentioned, the short courses offered 
by the Institute focused on a wide range of themes: ‘Brazil-
ian Actuality’, ‘Current Brazilian Portuguese’, ‘Dynamic 
Reading’ and ‘Business Management’.
We could interpret this as evidence that the Institute 
was genuinely liberal and only against statist policies and 
communism. That would make the IPES one of the early 
champions of a truly liberal order in Brazil. However, the 
think tank also represented a very common brand of political 
philosophy which defines the realization of liberty as based 
almost entirely on free market economy, notwithstanding 
an authoritarian regime. One of the few letters that put the 
position of the Institute plainly is a missive from the IPES’ 
president to the head of the National Security Service, Gen-
eral Carlos Alberto Fontoura, after the acceptance of a new 
military dictator by Congress:
On the political situation in our country, emphasizing a 
possible collaboration, my friends and I will eventually 
take pleasure and honor in giving to the Government 
of the Revolution, which we all strive to establish 
and maintain in our troubled Brazil. [...] the kind 
of government that the revolution necessarily had to 
create in order to correct the errors and damages of the 
social and political structure of the country is founded 
mainly and necessarily on prestige and military and 
civic potential of the Armed Forces […] I believe, Mr. 
General, that there are organizations and contingents 
of men of companies in this country […] who wish to 
give something of themselves to Brazil [and] should 
be incorporated. Of this group, the one I am most 
attached to is the IPES […] composed of civilian and 
military men, who managed to create a team spirit, 
and to push for decisive action for the Revolution 
that we all wanted (Correspondence October, 1969, 
our emphasis).
The IPES maintained a trajectory of lobbying, and put 
pressure both on João Goulart’s democratic government and 
the regime following the military coup. The IPES moved 
to offer services to the organizations that contributed to it, 
through courses directed at the business community that pro-
moted a particular (neo)liberal political economic perspec-
tive on management and business. In this sense, we would 
suggest that the IPES made use of an innovative form of 
ideological advocacy (Lagendijk and Needham 2012), in the 
form of management education. This is perhaps its most 
interesting legacy empirically and analytically, pointing 
towards the need for greater recognition of the ideological 
aspects of the political participation of business in this form.
In this, the IPES contributed to laying the foundations for 
a ‘second wave’ of management education in Brazil. Prior 
to the 1960s, the country had thousands of vocationally ori-
ented commerce schools (Barros 2016), but only a handful 
of business schools, in Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo and Minas 
Gerais (Cooke and Alcadipani 2015). In 1959, the Brazilian 
government signed a deal with the US state to facilitate the 
development of new business schools and consolidate those 
already existing, transferring money and expertise to a hand-
ful of Brazilian institutions (Cooke and Alcadipani 2015). 
The deal was signed around the same time that the Ford and 
Carnegie Foundations started pushing for a more academic 
approach towards management education (Augier et  al. 
2005; Khurana and Spender 2012; Khurana et al. 2011). 
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The Ford Foundation was especially active in influencing 
Brazilian business schools (Cooke and Alcadipani 2015).
Thus, in the 1960s, there were emerging efforts aiming 
to Americanize Brazilian management, and to spread mana-
gerial theory and practice as an ideological weapon in the 
Cold War (Cooke and Alcadipani 2015; Barros and Carrieri 
2013). The IPES advocated for academic training of man-
agers over on-the-job preparation and hereditary selection, 
including by offering post-graduate courses in management. 
This is, we would suggest, reflected in contemporary think 
tanks offering management and leadership development, and 
merits considerable further research.
Conclusion: From the Past to the Future 
of Think Tanks
We know from previous analyses that the neo-Marxist 
(Adler 2009) arguments and ideas of Antonio Gramsci can 
shed light on power relations between corporations and 
civil society (Levy and Egan 2003) or corporations and 
higher education (Chertkovskaya et al. forthcoming). We 
have shown here how the development of IPES as a think 
tank can be analysed as an exemplary case in this respect, 
especially in relation to its construction of knowledge as a 
productive resource (Adler 2009) for political change. First, 
we have shown the potential in understanding how ideas 
transit from small groups to wider social groups through 
think tank promotion of specific ethical–political positions 
on business and economy. The IPES pursued a diverse set 
of activities, all oriented towards political change insofar as 
the political structural conditions affected capital’s freedom 
to extract, employ, and trade, within Brazil and beyond, in 
support of the dominant form of capitalism of the moment 
emanating from the US. The development of a persuasive 
ideology was central to this, leading us towards an analysis 
that draws on Antonio Gramsci’s work for its perspective on 
the intersection of knowledge and ideology.
Second, we have shown that a think tank’s trajectory may 
be significant for management and organization studies not 
only because it was mainly a politically influential organiza-
tion financed and controlled by a specific group of business 
people, but also because it exemplifies how that elite devel-
ops a specific space to agree on a distinctive ideology and 
construct a unified position with claims to objectivity, for 
promotion in the public arena. This was, as Parmar (2015) 
argues in relation to think tanks in the US, a social project 
that focused on institutionalizing specific ways of manag-
ing economic change through political action, in ways that 
reinforced the elite grouping’s position. The involvement of 
corporate actors, and the resources they are able to bring, 
surely merits much more detailed analysis. Third, the IPES’ 
movement from an advocacy organization, passing through 
a lobbyist group phase, and then turning its focus towards 
management education, is of use in understanding the power 
of think tanks in shaping debates inside business schools.
Even though we chose a think tank that no longer exists 
for our analysis, we would suggest that the ways the IPES 
operated are closely related to the practices used by contem-
porary business associations, Barley’s (2010) ‘peak organi-
zations’, to put pressure on governments and convince wider 
social groups of their ideas (cf. McGoey 2015). By means 
of a historical example with a significant amount of data at 
our disposal, we were able to look behind the public facade 
which was constructed around a classically liberal–demo-
cratic organization. What we saw was a group that supported 
democracy only by convenience, and that was more preoc-
cupied with a freer economy in a (neo)liberal market sense, 
cleaving to a particularly US-oriented understanding of busi-
ness and management, no matter what the social cost.
Summing up, we would suggest that to understand the 
many ways that business corporations choose to influence 
society is of utmost importance if we are to understand 
the forces that shape our world (Barley 2010), especially 
country-specific forces and their effects. To understand the 
trajectory and modus operandi of think tanks is but one 
more step in moving towards a more transparent society in 
which people can see where and by whom decisions are 
taken (Medvetz 2012). For a longer time than necessary, 
scholars working in management and organization studies 
have mostly ignored the ethical and political powers of think 
tanks, especially those intertwined with the shifting power 
structures of global capitalism (Adler 2009), to shape public 
debate and state policy.
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